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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper models conflictual interaction between a European state and a domestic 
dissident immigrant minority group, Muslims say, some of whom may resort to acts of 
terrorism. Here, identity is crucial and provides the micro-foundations of dissident 
behaviour by solving the collective action problem; however, complex multiple identities 
are possible. Militancy or hatred of the West arises both because of the economic and 
social disadvantage experienced by Muslims or horizontal inequalities, as well as 
historical grievances and contemporary foreign policy actions that discriminate against the 
Muslim world. The fear of visible Muslim minorities among the European host 
population may be a product of strident propaganda emanating from certain segments of 
Western society. The innovation of the paper lies in modelling the interaction between 
fear and hatred. Excessive deterrence against ‘dangerous’ minority groups may backfire, 
compared to more accommodative policies. Space needs to be created so that Muslim 
migrants are able to merge their personal identities within their adopted European 
homelands. Also, the economic disadvantage experienced by Muslims needs redressing.        
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper presents a model of conflict between a European state and a domestic 
dissident immigrant minority group, such as Muslims. Identity plays a major part in 
this, and Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggest that individuals obtain utility from their 
identity and by making themselves, as well as others in their group, behave in 
conformity with group norms. But it also has to be borne in mind that individuals 
often have multiple identities, as emphasised by Sen (2008). It is possible, therefore, 
to be both Muslim and European and believe in most values that characterise Western 
humanism. The dislike of resident Muslim minority groups amongst the majority is 
not only predicated upon real dangers of potential violence from certain Muslim 
groups, but is also a product of adverse propaganda about them, some of which may 
be only partially true. Glaeser (2005) models the production of this phenomenon as an 
outcome of repetitive adverse propaganda, which results in distrust, dislike and in this 
instance is something that can be labelled ‘Islamophobia’. In what follows I define 
this as fear. Segments of the minority group (fundamentalists) may feel hatred for the 
West. This hate is a result of present-day socio-economic injustices against them in 
the European countries, as well as historical injustices and contemporary foreign 
policy actions. Dislike of the West manifests itself in a spectrum of activities ranging 
from innocuous actions such as the expression of disagreement, to making statements 
of difference via the adoption of dress codes (the wearing of the hijab or head scarf, 
for example) which to some Westerners is an offensive rejection of Western values 
(and a threat to Western civilization), to acts of vandalism, such as the riots (looting, 
car burning) in the suburbs of Paris, and finally to the more violent terrorist actions 
such as the Madrid train bombings of March 2004, or the London bombings of July 
2005. The interaction between this fear of Muslims and Muslim hatred for the West 
may sometimes only produce a disagreeable atmosphere, but at other times it can 
result in fatal conflict. What transforms this latent danger into violence and terrorism?    
 
There can be two explanations for this. One is the inevitable clash of civilizations, as 
outlined by Huntington (1996)? Muslim acts of defiance may be a product of their 
deep sense of historic and present-day humiliation, as pointed out by Lindner (2001). 
These include historical acts such as the wholesale expulsion of Muslims from Spain 
(in the 16th and 17th centuries) and from Sicily (14th century), as well as events in the 
20th century in the Middle East, where the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot pact1 (during the 
First World War) resulted in an unfair disposition of the former Ottoman territories. 
Later, the emergence of what many regard as a colonial settler state, Israel2, and the 
West’s lack of even handed behaviour towards the protagonists in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict spawned deep resentment. This is often blamed on Western double standards 
towards the plight of Muslims compared to others. Other perceived areas of Muslim 
disadvantage in the recent past include the unfair partioning of undivided India 
leading to the Kashmir problem. Some Western writers, such as Lewis (2003), also 
depict Muslims as wallowing in wounded pride about their historical decline, with 
some filled with a virulent hatred for the West. 
 
                                                 
1 The novelist Arthur Koestler described the Balfour declaration in 1917 permitting a Jewish state in 
Palestine as an act where "one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third." 
2 An expression employed by the French writer, Maxime Rodinson.  
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The problem with culturalist views is that it treats culture as monolithic, and 
individual identity as a singular phenomenon, ignoring the multiplicity of identities 
that individuals may possibly possess (Sen, 2008). Thus, it is conceivable to be 
simultaneously a Muslim, a European citizen, a believer in democracy, as well as 
someone who respects difference and human rights. Contemporary racism is driven 
more by dislike of a cultural identity such as Islam, rather than discredited notions 
about race and colour, as in the past. Racist messages that breed fear of minorities like 
Muslims can emanate from attention seeking politicians, who campaign on a single 
issue that scapegoat a particular group for all of society’s ills (crime, unemployment 
and so on).  Their ability to influence policy rests with their nuisance value as 
potential coalition partners and attractiveness to a class of voters, which is greater in 
smaller European states with electoral systems that have full proportional 
representation. In other countries (such as France) they have greater influence in local 
politics. According to surveys3, negative perceptions about Muslims among non-
Muslims have grown in Europe: in 2008 52% in Spain, 50% in Germany, 38% in 
France and 23% in the UK felt negative about Muslims, considering them a threat to 
Western civilization. Thus, in some European nations it may be relatively less 
politically incorrect to openly cast unqualified aspersions on Muslim practices and 
Islam.4 The same survey indicates growth in the Muslim sense of identity amongst 
Muslims immigrants in Europe.          
 
It is widely believed that Islam is an intolerant and violent religion, with its sacred 
texts full of inflammatory statements about its foes. Unfortunately, these notions are 
based on selective and limited interpretation. What is much less well known is the 
tolerant face of Islam, for example the fact that the Islamic religion, through its 
scripture, the Quran, actually celebrates racial diversity5 and requires believers to 
acknowledge the authority of earlier Abrahamic Prophets.6 Some of the sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his cousin and son-in-law Ali, during Islam’s earliest phase 
are testimony towards inclusiveness of racial groups and Muslim and non-Muslim 
alike.7 Historically, Muslim rulers in Arab Spain and the Ottoman Empire, for 
                                                 
3 http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262  
4 In the UK, for example, the virulently anti-Muslim Dutch politician Geert Wilders was prevented 
from showing his anti-Islam film in the British House of Lords in February 2009 on the grounds that it 
might incite racial hatred; by contrast, his popularity is said to be on the rise in his native Netherlands.   
5 “O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye 
may know one another. Lo! the noblest of you, in the sight of Allah, is the best in conduct”. Quran: 
049.013. Another verse says: “And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the 
difference of your languages and colours”. Quran: 030.022. English translations of the Quran from 
Marmaduke Pickthall’s, The Glorious Quran,  http://www.islam101.com/quran/QTP/index.htm 
6 “Say (O Muhammad): We believe in Allah and that which is revealed unto us and that which was 
revealed unto Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and that which was vouchsafed 
unto Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, 
and unto Him we have surrendered”. Quran: 003.084 
7 Consider an excerpt from Muhammad’s Last Sermon (circa 632 AD): “O people, Remember that your 
Lord is One. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor a non-Arab superiority over an Arab; 
also a black person has no superiority over a white person, nor a white person any superiority over a 
black person, except by piety and good action. Indeed the best among you is the one with the best 
character. Listen to me. Did I convey this to you properly?” People responded, “Yes. O messenger of 
God”. The Prophet then said, “each one of you who is there must convey this to everyone not present”.  
http://www.themodernreligion.com/prophet/prophet_lastsermon.htm 
Ali, the 4th Islamic Caliph, also the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad in a letter to Malik-e-Ashtar, 
his governor designate to Egypt (circa 656-661 AD): "Remember, Malik, that amongst your subjects 
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example, showed greater tolerance for non-Muslims than their European counterparts 
did for non-Christians, even Christians of other denominations. The important point is 
that a devout or practicing Muslim must eschew racism in all forms, and should not 
hate Judeo-Christian civilization and reject universal values of toleration; rather the 
dislike of the West could emanate from injustices perpetrated thereof.   
 
Thus, the alternative explanation for disgruntled Muslim behaviour in Europe may lie 
in wider socio-economic disadvantage. Stewart (2008) has documented the systematic 
disadvantage that Muslim groups face in European countries and worldwide (Muslims 
are a fifth or more of humanity). These range from economic discrimination in terms 
of jobs and lower incomes, to under representation in public life. This phenomenon 
may be described as the horizontal inequalities that Muslims suffer from in 
contemporary Europe. Horizontal inequality is group-based inequality, rather than the 
inequality in an otherwise culturally or ethnically homogenous society; see Stewart 
(2000) on this. Muslim citizens in Europe are systematically poorer, suffer from 
greater unemployment and are less than proportionately represented in public life 
(Stewart, 2008), in addition to the opprobrium their cultural identity attracts. 
 
Thus, some of the more extreme forms of terrorism and even other non-violent acts, 
which make a statement of difference with the majority community such as the 
wearing of hijabs, may have as their root cause, both the collective sense of injury 
caused by the sufferings of Muslims globally (such as in Palestine, Iraq or 
Afghanistan), as well as the more palpable economic, political and social 
discrimination felt within the European states that they reside in.  
 
In what follows I present a model of a ‘clash’ between a European state and a 
domestic dissident group, who, on occasion, resort to acts of terrorism. Here, identity 
is crucial to the putative terrorist; following Akerlof and Kranton (2000) individuals 
derive utility from their identity, identity based actions and the relative social standing 
of their group. This provides the micro-foundations of dissident group behaviour by 
solving the collective action problem. Following Sen (2008) individuals are allowed 
multiple (complex) identities; they may not always act in conformity with their 
primary identity. This is an innovation of the paper, going beyond Akerlof and 
Kranton (2008). ‘Hatred’ for the West emanates both from horizontal inequality 
producing economic factors such as poverty and greater unemployment, as well as 
exclusion (or less inclusion) in domestic political processes, and ‘cultural’ factors 
such as Western foreign policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, as Sen 
(2008) suggests, potentially violence producing hate is a product of both economic 
and cultural factors. Another innovation of the paper is the combination of the hate 
felt by Muslim fundamentalists with the fear felt by those with strong Islamophobic 
tendencies. This fear can be said to be the result, in part, of fear producing messages 
about the dangers posed by Muslims that are at least partially untrue (Glaeser, 2005).  
                                                                                                                                            
there are two kinds of people: those who have the same religion as you have; they are brothers to you, 
and those who have religions other than that of yours, they are human beings like you. Men of either 
category suffer from the same weaknesses and disabilities that human beings are inclined to, they 
commit sins, indulge in vices either intentionally or foolishly and unintentionally without realizing the 
enormity of their deeds. Let your mercy and compassion come to their rescue and help in the same way 
and to the same extent that you expect Allah to show mercy and forgiveness to you." (Nahjul Balagha) 
http://www.al-islam.org/nahjul/letters/letter53.htm#letter53. 
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2 FEAR AND HATRED  
 
2.1 Government (G): 
 
The utility of the state or the majority group is given by: 
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The superscripts P and C refer to states which are more peaceful and confrontative, 
respectively. GP and GC correspond to budget constraints in the two states. For the 
government8, utility is derived from two public goods: general consumption (YG) and 
security expenditure (A). The latter can be used in two ways: a component (FG) 
devoted to suppressing dissidents (via policing, surveillance and the prohibition of 
certain practices), and another element T, which is a transfer to the dissident group, 
which serves to assuage their grievances. The transfer can mean several things: 
increased (broad-based) public expenditure, greater inclusion in public sector jobs, 
political representation and voice in the decision making process. Generally speaking, 
it is the pecuniary value of including the excluded. Observe that there is a trade-off 
between suppression (stick) and transfers (carrot). Note that strategies for both 
government (a) and dissidents (e) are in terms of peaceful behaviour, which is the 
inverse of conflict, so a, e raise the probability of peace, π. C refers to the cost of 
undertaking a by the state, Ca > 0. These costs consist of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
elements; the first because of the cost of distortionary taxation to finance security, the 
latter because accommodating dissidents entails a political cost by alienating those 
opposed to the policies adopted. Violent acts occur in the confrontative state, and the 
Nash equilibrium to the game between the two sides occurs along a continuum of 
peaceful actions by both sides. Equilibria with low levels of peace chosen by both 
sides are confrontative, enhancing the risk of rioting and terrorism by the dissidents.    
 
The parameter µ represents policies adopted by the government side towards certain 
minority groups, such as ‘radical’ Muslims. A higher µ implies a more confrontative 
majority that is less inclusive towards certain minorities and more resolved to combat 
their dissidence, so in a way it is similar to military efficiency (force multiplier) 
modelled in Hirshleifer (1995). Its origins are, however, different, because it is a 
result of fictional or exaggerated hate producing messages in the media, fed in by 
some politicians (Glaeser, 2005).  
 
                                                 
8 Equation (1) represents the preferences of a median voter, or the outcome of a policy compromise. 
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Furthermore, µ measures the sum of the signal sent to individuals in European society 
regarding the potential damage that could be inflicted by Muslim migrants living in 
their midst; it also incorporates personal costs of damage limitation (avoiding contacts 
with Muslims at work and by moving to other neighbourhoods).9 Let us say this 
signal is sent out by a politician, whose credibility is in doubt because he may be 
deliberately sending out a false hate message as a cheap way of advancing his own 
popularity. Its attractiveness to the public will depend on their need for scapegoats 
and their own personal life experiences of these minority groups. Not all these signals 
will be believed: for example, some hate mongering politicians may be mistrusted, the 
better educated among the public may discount part of the message and others with 
greater knowledge of the minorities based upon personal interaction may similarly 
disregard this signal.10 There is a cost (z) to members of the public of verifying the 
veracity of the signal through a search process. Let φ be the probability that the 
politician is sending out a false message and the Muslim group in question is largely 
is innocent; 1 – φ is the probability that they are not, and will therefore impose a net 
cost µ. An individual’s Bayesian prior for this is determined in the following manner: 
 
µϕϕ
ϕ
)1( −+           (3) 
 
The prior may be updated subject to the aforementioned search cost z, and other 
exogenous events like riots and acts of terrorism (close to home) perpetrated by 
Muslims The public is composed of two types: a high cost type (indexed by subscript 
h) who both suffer more potential damage (µ) and also have higher search costs (z); 
and, a low cost type (subscript l) who will suffer less from Muslims and have lower 
search costs of finding out the truth. The former may include the less educated, the 
more socio-economically disadvantaged, those who would like to find close to home 
scapegoats for the risk of unemployment that the globalization of production brings, 
others who wish to find a simple explanation for the rise of crime, as well as those 
with an experience of negative interactions with Muslims. In general: 
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Where V represents expected utility and y income of individuals of i = h,l types. 
Maximization of this expected utility with respect to search (z) leads to the conditions 
described in the second and third lines of (4) respectively. The high cost type of 
individual suffers both a greater loss from Muslim dissidents (µh) and has a higher 
cost of verification of the signal (zh). This is all the more so, if the search costs of 
verifying the signal entail a lumpy fixed cost. These individuals are more likely to 
abandon the costly search for truth in favour of the hate message. Not only that, but 
they will clamour for public action against the object of their phobia. Even the low 
cost type individual (who will engage in the search for truth) may at certain times 
randomise the probability of φ around 0 or 1, if say equilibrium φ ≈ 1/2 in (3), when 
                                                 
9 Despite a seeming similarity, the analysis here differs from the traditional economics of 
discrimination literature (Becker, 1971).  
10 The PEW world surveys indicate that dislike of Muslims in Europe is greater among the older and 
less educated segments of the population; http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=262. 
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the search process itself is flawed (involving learning over multiple periods, say). 
Also, after major riots involving (male) Muslim youths and terrorist attacks like the 
London bombings, all individuals from the majority community may set φ to zero for 
a certain time, effectively tarring all Muslims with the same (terrorist) brush. 
 
If enough citizens or voters believe the signal then public action will be called for, and 
Islamophobia or fear of Muslims acquires the nature of a public good. Note that 
µµ =∑
i
i  in equations (1) and (2).  The state will be compelled to act at the taxpayers 
expense (C), but some individuals within the government machinery may have 
reservations about totally surrendering to Islamophobia.  It is instructive, therefore, to 
examine the government’s strategic variable. Totally differentiating, a, the 
government’s strategic choice variable in (2): 
 
µ
µ
d
F
TdA
F
T
F
Tda G
A
GG
A
22
)()( •−

 •−=         (5) 
 
All the partial derivatives in (5) are positive. The security budget (A) can be utilised 
either to increase transfers to the dissidents or fight them. Therein lies a trade-off; thus 
the term in square brackets in (5) is ambiguous in sign. The second term on the right-
hand side of (5) is negative, because a rise in the confrontativeness of the state or 
majority (µ) causes it to be less ‘peaceful’. For a certain type of government, the first 
term is positive; it prefers peace.11 I utilise this taxonomy, because there may be 
different expenditure effects following an increase in the security budget depending 
on the type of government in different countries (or even the same government at 
different time periods).  
 
The government side maximizes (1) with respect to a: 
 
a
CP
a CGG =− (.)](.)[π         (6) 
Essentially, this means that the government equates the marginal utility of its strategic 
action (a) on the left-hand side of (6) to its marginal cost on the right-hand side. 
 
2.2 Dissident Minorities (R): 
 
We need to distinguish between individual motivation to behave in accordance with a 
dissident group, and the alienated group dynamics leading to a clash with the state.  
 
As far as individuals are concerned, following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), I 
postulate that individuals directly obtain utility from their identity, and the behaviour 
demanded by that sense of belonging. Thus, an individual member (r) of a potential 
minority group (say, Muslims in Europe) derives utility (Ur) from identity related 
                                                 
11 Good examples could be given by contrasting the present Spanish and Danish governments. The 
latter’s (or some of its coalition partners) negative attitudes and explicit policies towards Muslims is 
well known; see http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/denmark/#identifier_73_465 . By contrast 
the Spanish government led by Prime Minister Zapatero is far more conciliatory towards Muslims, 
including illegal Muslim migrants, and Zapatero called for an international alliance of civilizations; see 
http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/328/251/lang,english/ 
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actions in the following manner (other arguments of the utility function such as 
consumption are ignored): 
 
),,(
)(),,(
θjrrr
rorjrsr
ssII
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rjkUIssUU
=
≠+= "
       (7) 
 
Here the parameter s refers to self-identity or principal identity based actions, and 
utility (Uo) from other identity based actions, kr. These two enter individual utility in 
an additive and separable fashion. An individual, therefore, is allowed to have a 
complex multiple identity (Sen, 2008), and corresponding to these are additive 
separable actions or inputs into his utility function, which is an innovation of the 
model. The individual not only derives utility from a vector of his own actions (sr), 
but also similar actions of other like-minded individuals belonging to his group (sj), 
and above all his own identity or self image (Ir), which in turn depends on the actions 
(sr, sj) just described, as well as the inverse of the group’s social standing, θ. As 
indicated earlier, this depends both on the group’s perceived economic horizontal 
inequalities, and other factors such as the West’s foreign policy towards the Muslim 
world. As defined, the higher is θ, the lower is the group’s social standing, which as 
indicated earlier may be worse in some European countries (Denmark, Netherlands) 
than others (the UK). Thus an increase in θ is a reduction of social standing, but it will 
enhance utility from own-identity based actions. It could be argued, however, that low 
social standing may encourage individuals to abandon their primary identity in favour 
of other more approved of identities. Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), it is 
possible to show that many such individuals may be deterred from this course of 
action by their peers, even if injury to their group sense of self-esteem is insufficient 
to make them act in accordance with their primary identity.  
 
The budget constraint describing input or actions to individual utility takes on the 
following form (where Sr refers to the total endowment of possible actions): 
 
orr ksS +≤ ),( θµ          (8) 
It is postulated that the attractiveness of inputs into own-identity type behaviour (sr) 
rises with µ and θ; an increase in both can be described as a fall in the relative price of 
own-identity based actions relative to other-identity based actions (kr).12  
 
Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000) it is also possible to show that individuals 
derive disutility from the non-conformity of other group members, who do not act or 
behave in an appropriate manner; see also Gates (2002) on rebel recruitment and 
retention. Secondly, if the costs of so-doing are sufficiently low compared to the pain 
inflicted on errant members, individuals of a group will exert effort to bring back 
members who have strayed from ideal group behaviour back to the fold, as analysed 
by Akerlof and Kranton (2005). Such behaviour can also be said to describe the 
strategies adopted by conflict entrepreneurs amongst Muslim minority groups who are 
bent on confrontation. If another group member (j) suffers disutility (Ij) from other-
                                                 
12 These could include actions which conform more to the spirit of the law of the land, and other 
actions that might be considered by some to be at variance with the individual’s principal identity.  
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identity based behaviour (kr) by person r, who is also close to him, they may lure the 
errant individual back to the fold provided that the cost of doing so to themselves (cj) 
is not too large and is less than the loss inflicted (lr) on the deviant group member. 
Typically, remonstrating with someone who has made a conscious decision to act 
‘differently’ is not without pain to either remonstrant or errant:  
 
rjj lIc <<           (9) 
 
The condition above is more likely to hold amongst poor but culturally homogenous 
communities suffering from widespread unemployment, and who live proximately to 
each other in isolated ghettos with close kinship ties (as in many metropolitan 
locations throughout Europe where Muslim families related to each other live cheek 
by jowl in sub-standard housing). This is also typical of the horizontal inequalities 
faced by many Muslim groups in Europe. Moreover, the dissident group may use the 
behaviour denoted in (9) to solve the collective action problem, as described by Olson 
(1965). Thus, group grievances become individual grievances, and individuals act 
upon their group grievances. This, at the extreme, can include terrorist acts, which are 
acts of solidarity with the cause as described by Wintrobe (2002). An act of solidarity 
is an all or nothing choice (corner solution) between individual autonomy and 
solidarity with the group’s cause.13 Dissident group behaviour is arrived at after 
summing the choices regarding sr from individual utility maximization described in 
(7) above subject to individual constraints in (8): 
 
∑
=
n
r
rs
1
                                        (10) 
 
For collective action to take place via the adoption of the group strategy (e)14, a 
critical threshold of aggregate own-identity based actions, ∑sr, must be chosen. This 
requires high enough values of µ and θ; condition (9) must also hold, it should not be 
too costly to deter non-own-identity based actions by individuals except that at high 
enough values of µ and θ condition (9) becomes more relaxed, as more self-enforcing 
own-identity based behaviour takes place via (8). The dissident group, objective or 
utility function, R, takes the following form: 
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13 In Wintrobe (2002), individual indifference curves representing the trade-off between autonomy and 
solidarity are concave, with corner solutions; small shifts in the budget line as a result of more 
‘containing’ policies by the state do not shift this all or nothing equilibrium choice of extreme 
solidarity with the cause.  
14 Not all group actions are violent; an increase in e indicates more peaceful behaviour, the risk of 
violence increases with declining e.   
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RP and RC describe dissident group endowments for collective action, which can 
involve absorbing the transfer (T) or ‘fighting’ (FR) the state.  This choice surrounds e 
(effort with regard to peace with the state); E describes the aggregate cost function for 
undertaking e, composed of psychic costs of ‘capitulation’ to the state or the total 
losses and costs of inducing own-identity based behaviour in (9), with Ee > 0. FR 
represents direct action against the state. As already indicated, θ denotes the alienated 
group’s historical hatreds and the lack of contemporary social standing based also on 
economic horizontal inequalities. 
 
Differentiating the dissident group’s strategic variable (e) in (12) we find: 
 
µθθµ µθ
d
F
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F
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F
Tde RRR
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22
)()(
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•−•−=                (13) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of (13) is positive, e rises with T, but falls with θ 
and µ. In other words, transfers from the state raise peaceful behaviour; economic 
disadvantage, a loss in social standing and government proscription increases 
radicalization or decreases peaceful behaviour by the dissidents towards the state. 
 
The disgruntled group will maximise (11) with respect to e: 
 [ ] eCPe ERR =− (.)(.)π                    (14) 
Thus, they equate the marginal benefit of its action (e) to its marginal cost. 
 
2.4 Reaction functions 
 
In order to analyse variations in parameters we first need to obtain a set of reaction 
functions in (a, e) space to capture government-dissident interaction. Equations (6) 
and (14) form the basis of the reaction functions for the government and the 
dissidents, obtained by totally differentiating them with respect to a and e. Thus: 
 [ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅ ⋅−⋅+= aeCPae
PC
aaaa
G ifGG
GGC
Rda
de ππ
π                (15)  
 
and [ ][ ] 00)()( )()(/ ≤≥≤≥⋅−⋅+ ⋅−⋅= aePCeeee
CP
ae
R ifRRE
RR
Rda
de ππ
π   (16) 
 
Note that πae = πea by symmetry. Also even though πa, πe >0, πaa, πee < 0, meaning 
there are diminishing returns to peaceful behaviour. Caa, Eee > 0, RP > RC, GP > GC. 
 
We assume that the two strategies are complements, .0>aeπ  In other words more 
peaceful action by one side leads to the same by the other. The reaction functions will 
be positively sloped in Figure 1.  
 
2.5 An increase in government militancy (a rise in µ):  
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An increase in government militancy (a rise in µ) may result from an increase in the 
vote bank of populist political parties that are more confrontative, as the result of an 
increase in the supply of repetitive hate-creating stories by politicians (Glaeser, 2005) 
culminating in heavy handed policies such as laws banning head scarves, tighter 
immigration rules from certain countries, as well as a whole host of involuntary 
integrationist policies. In Figure 1 the reaction function of the government RG1 shifts 
leftwards to RG2, as there is less incentive to be peaceful (a) for each level of e, see 
equations (1)-(5). A similar line of reasoning applies to the dissidents, (equations (7)-
(9)), and their reaction functions shift down from RR1 to RR2. The new equilibrium will 
have shifted from A to point B in Figure 1 with a decline in both a and e, peaceful 
behaviour by both sides to this quarrel, but a greater decline in a relative to e. The 
dissident group’s stock of collective action, given from (7)-(9), has increased because 
the private relative price and marginal cost of own-identity based actions has fallen, 
and these are now more attractive.   
 
 
e 
a 
Figure 1: Strategic Interaction Between the 
Government and Dissidents 
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2.6 A Rise in Radicalization or the Intrinsic Motivation to Fight the State (θ) 
 
An increase in the intrinsic motivation to fight the state by the dissidents can arise 
because of two sets of reasons. One is a the widening of economic, political and social 
horizontal inequalities that disadvantage Muslims in European countries as discussed 
by Stewart (2008), or a gradual reaction to laws that discriminate against Muslims 
(such as head scarf bans initiated by the state). The second relates to world events, 
such as the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the situations in 
Palestine or Kashmir, that add to the collective Muslim stock of grievances. For 
example, the recent Israeli military operations in Gaza, and the perceived Western 
support for this incursion, which many regard as a disproportionate reaction to 
Hamas’ activities, can only serve to increase resentment among Muslims.  Either way, 
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the dissident reaction function will shift down in Figure 1 indicating less e, and more 
fighting against the state at point C, for the reasons outlined above.  
 
2.7 External Finance for Dissident Groups 
 
Several radical Muslim groups have alleged connections to global terrorist networks 
like Al-Qaida, and are said to receive finance and technical support from them. This, 
arguably, has mostly an effect on their operations or costs, not their intrinsic 
motivation. We may re-write the dissident objective function in (11) as: 
 
 )())(1(),( eERReaR CP τππ −⋅−+=                (17) 
Where τ represents a cost shift parameter, increases in τ indicate a rise in the cost of 
strategic action. The first-order condition for optimal action (e) by the dissidents when 
τ rises, as a result of external assistance is (note that the assistance is conditional on 
reducing peaceful actions, e): 
 [ ] eCPe EdRR τπ =− (.)(.)                 (18) 
Thus the marginal cost of peaceful behaviour, on the right-hand side of (18) has 
increased, more confrontation is chosen by the dissident group. Qualitatively, a 
movement from point A to C in figure 1 is applicable, with a shift in the dissident 
reaction function indicating less e for every level of a chosen by the state.   
 
3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Regarding the potential dangers of the interaction between fear and hatred, if points 
such as A in figure 1 may be described as uneasy, points such as B and C with less 
peaceful behaviour are certainly more precarious with a simmering risk of riotous 
behaviour and terrorism.   
 
I would like to conclude by first arguing that Islamic fundamentalism (hate in this 
paper) feeds on the West’s historical and present rejection of Islam in its struggle to 
achieve parity with western Christianity as an equally important world religion, as 
well as the present-day real and perceived maltreatment of Muslims and Muslim 
causes. I do not believe its distaste for the West is based on primordial hatred; nor is it 
the case that the primordial ‘fundamentalist’ objective is the obliteration of Western 
values from the planet.15 Rather, it is a political movement with political solutions. 
The various sources quoted in the introduction also point to a more tolerant and 
inclusive side of Islam, which may more widely re-surface given the right conditions. 
The amelioration of objective injustices and glaring double-standards when it comes 
to the Muslim world, apologies for historical injustices committed by the West, and of 
course economic progress by Muslims in Europe will take the wind out of the sails of 
fundamentalism. In this connection, it is interesting to note that explicitly religious 
parties rarely get more than a fifth of the vote in democratic Muslim countries. One of 
the enduring lessons of history is that economic development and prosperity modifies 
culture, religious beliefs and practices. 
 
                                                 
15 As stated, for example, by the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in an address at Georgetown 
University, Washington D.C, on 26th May 2006.  
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As far as the policy implications are concerned, first excessive deterrence against 
potential dissidents may backfire, a point also made in Addison and Murshed (2005). 
This is because it produces more militancy and swells the ranks of the disaffected, and 
increases the danger of both vandalism and terrorist violence.  Secondly, space needs 
to be created so that most Muslim migrants are able to merge their personal identities 
within their adopted European homelands. This includes developing a personal 
imperative to be tolerant of difference. This will serve to increase the costs of 
admonishing other group members for adopting behaviour in conformity with the 
‘other-identities’ that make up their complex personal identity. Policies that make it 
difficult to be both European and Muslim are bound to be self-defeating, and voice 
needs to be given to a wider range of Muslims, not just the Salman Rushdies and Hirsi 
Ayan Alis of Europe. Many of the perpetrators of the London bombings were well 
integrated second generation immigrants before becoming radicalized. Thirdly, 
economic discrimination, the horizontal inequalities faced by Muslims in Europe, 
needs addressing. As Tadjoeddin and Murshed (2007) point out routine violence in 
Java, Indonesia (akin to the vandalism perpetrated by Muslim rioters in Europe) 
ultimately declines with socio-economic progress. Economic progress will reduce the 
power of the ghetto by permitting exit from the ghetto; allowing individual Muslims 
to act more on the basis of their ‘other’ identities, and raise the costs of luring them 
back into ‘distatsteful’ and dubious own identity based violence like rioting or 
terrorism. Protest is ultimately motivated by exclusion. Finally, democracy provides 
no panacea against the rise to prominence and electoral success of rabble-rousing 
nationalistic demagogues of various types, as Aristotle presciently pointed out in his 
Politics more than 2300 years ago. The message being that democracy, without 
effective checks and balances, risks producing conflict and crises. A well-ordered 
decent society may be one that is tolerant of difference; one that is at peace with itself 
and others in the sense described by Rawls (1999); but even affluent advanced 
Western democracies have still some distance to cover before achieving this ideal.   
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